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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
   
No.  20-2792 
   
 
FRANKLIN MICHAEL BERESFORD, 
 




ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
 
      
On Petition for Review of an Order of the  
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA-1: A057-406-863) 
Immigration Judge: Kuyomars “Q” Golparvar 
      
 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
on April 23, 2021 
 
 
Before: AMBRO, RESTREPO, Circuit Judges, and NOREIKA,* District Judge 
 





*  The Honorable Maryellen Noreika, United States District Judge for the District of 
Delaware, sitting by designation.  
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OPINION* 
    
 
NOREIKA, District Judge 
Petitioner Franklin Michael Beresford seeks review of a final order by the Board 
of Immigration Appeals dismissing his appeal from an Immigration Judge’s 
determination that he is removable from the United States and ineligible for cancellation 
of removal.  For the following reasons, the petition will be denied. 
I. Background 
Beresford is a native and citizen of Guyana who was admitted to the United States 
as a lawful permanent resident on July 22, 2008.  From approximately April 2012 
through April 2014, Beresford worked as a cargo handler at John F. Kennedy 
International Airport (JFK) in Queens, New York.  By his own admission, during this 
wo-year period, Beresford stole mail from airplanes and acted as a lookout so that others 
could do so.  A.R. 352–53.  On November 14, 2016, Beresford pled guilty to mail theft in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1708.  He was convicted in the Eastern District of New York on 
February 20, 2018 and sentenced to five months’ imprisonment. 
A. Proceedings Before the Immigration Court 
The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) initiated removal proceedings on 
July 31, 2018, by serving Beresford with a Notice to Appear (“NTA”).  The NTA 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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charged that he was removable because he had been convicted of a crime involving moral 
turpitude committed within five years after admission for which a sentence of one year or 
longer may be imposed.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i).  In support of the charge of 
removability, the Government submitted, inter alia, the Presentence Investigation Report  
(“the PSR”) prepared in connection with Beresford’s conviction.  Although the first 
Immigration Judge to decide the issue sustained the charge of removability and ordered 
his removal, A.R. 210, Beresford successfully appealed to the Board of Immigration 
Appeals, which remanded the case for additional fact-finding on the issue of whether he 
committed the crime of mail theft within five years of his admission, A.R. 145–46. 
After remand, a second Immigration Judge held a hearing on September 18, 2019, 
at which he made several comments regarding the status of the case before him.  The 
Immigration Judge suggested that the Government submit a Form I-261 to indicate 
specifically when the crime was committed and added that “on the I-261 you just need to 
indicate that . . . the offense described in allegation number 4 was committed between 
this date and this date, that’s all that’s needed.”  A.R. 73, 78.  He also noted that there 
were several judicially noticeable documents in the record suggesting that the crime had 
been committed within five years of admission to the United States.  After summarizing 
those documents, the Immigration Judge asked the Government counsel whether he had 
set forth its arguments correctly and the DHS attorney agreed.  The Immigration Judge 
also invited Beresford, who was represented by counsel, to submit additional briefs or 
evidence. 
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The Government timely filed the Form I-261 specifying that Beresford committed 
the conduct underlying his mail theft conviction “on or about April 2012 to on or about 
April 2014.”  A.R. 136.  At the next hearing, Beresford denied the charge of removability 
and the factual allegation concerning when the offense was committed. 
The Immigration Judge sustained both the factual allegation and the charge of 
removability, finding that the Government had shown by clear and convincing evidence 
that the crime occurred within five years of Beresford’s admission to the United States.  
In coming to this decision, the Immigration Judge considered Beresford’s Judgment 
Order, Superseding Indictment, and PSR and concluded that, because Beresford had pled 
guilty to committing mail theft between February 2009 and December 2014 and this 
range had “significant overlap” with the five years after his admission, there was 
sufficient evidence within the record of conviction to find the Government had met its 
burden.  A.R. 67.  In the alternative, the Immigration Judge found that there was 
sufficient evidence in the record of conviction and the PSR, because the latter 
consistently stated that Beresford worked at the airport from April 2012 to April 2014 
and included his written statement that he stole mail and acted as a lookout during that 
two year period.  A.R. 67. 
B. Proceedings Before the Board of Immigration Appeals 
Beresford filed a second appeal with the Board of Immigration Appeals on 
November 25, 2019.  The Board dismissed the appeal, holding that he had waived his 
claim that the Immigration Judge had shown bias towards DHS, that he had received a 
full and fair hearing, and that the Government had proven removability by clear and 
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convincing evidence.  A.R. 3–5.  The Board affirmed the Immigration Judge’s 
determination that the Government had proven removability through the presentation of 
the PSR and did not address whether he properly determined that the conviction record 
alone proved removability.  A.R. 4.  This petition for review followed. 
II. Discussion1  
Beresford raises two issues on appeal.  First, he argues that the Board erred by 
concluding that the Immigration Judge did not prejudge the case and acted fairly and 
impartially.  Second, Beresford challenges the Board’s determination that the 
Government met its burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that he committed 
the mail theft offense within five years of his admission to the United States. 
As to the first issue, petitioners in a deportation proceeding are entitled to “a full 
and fair hearing that allows them a reasonable opportunity to present evidence on their 
behalf and a decision on the merits of their claim by a neutral and impartial arbiter.”  
Serrano-Alberto v. Att’y Gen., 859 F.3d 208, 213 (3d Cir. 2017) (cleaned up).  To prove a 
due process violation, a petitioner must show “(1) that he was prevented from reasonably 
presenting his case and (2) that substantial prejudice resulted,” meaning the petitioner 
must demonstrate that the Immigration Judge’s conduct had “the potential for affecting 
 
1  The Board had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3).  This Court has jurisdiction to 
review the Board’s decision under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).  Where the Board issues its own decision 
and relies upon the reasoning of the immigration judge, this Court reviews the decision of the 
Board and those portions of the immigration judge’s reasoning adopted in the Board’s opinion.  
See Patel v. Att’y Gen., 599 F.3d 295, 297 (3d Cir. 2010).  Questions of law and constitutional 
claims are reviewed de novo.  See id.; Abulashvili v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 197, 207 (3d Cir. 
2011). 
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the outcome of the deportation proceedings.”  Id. (emphasis in original).  “[J]udicial 
conduct is improper whenever a judge appears biased, even if she actually is not biased.”  
Abulashvili v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 197, 207 (3d Cir. 2011) (cleaned up).  This Court has 
previously found due process violations in cases with particularly problematic conduct by 
immigration judges, such as conducting lengthy cross-examinations, Abulashvili, 663 
F.3d at 207, unfairly limiting an individual’s responses, Serrano-Alberto, 859 F.3d at 224, 
or belittling the individual’s choices, Wang v. Att’y Gen., 423 F.3d 260, 263 (3d Cir. 
2005). 
The conduct of the Immigration Judge in this matter is a far cry from the conduct 
this Court has held violates due process rights.  The Immigration Judge suggested that the 
Government submit an additional filing addressing the issue underlying the Board’s 
remand.  This suggests a desire for efficiency rather than a bias.  The remainder of the 
Immigration Judge’s remarks summarized evidence already in the record.  None of the 
comments demonstrate the “pervasiveness and egregiousness” that suggests a due process 
violation.  Serrano-Alberto, 859 F.3d at 224. 
As to the second issue raised on appeal, when evaluating “the specific way in 
which an offender committed the crime on a specific occasion,” this Court uses the 
circumstance-specific approach set out in Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 34 (2009).  
When using this approach, it is appropriate to rely on sentencing-related material, id. at 
42, and the PSR, Fan Wang v. Att’y Gen., 898 F.3d 341, 348 (3d Cir. 2018). 
For Beresford to be removable as charged, he must have engaged in mail theft 
within five years of his July 22, 2008, admission to the United States.  The PSR states 
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that Beresford was employed as a ramp agent at Terminal One “from approximately 
April 2012 through April 2014” and that “during this period of employment, Beresford 
stole mail from airplanes at Terminal One, and assisted others in stealing mail.”  
A.R. 352 (emphasis added).  The PSR also includes a written statement Beresford 
provided to Postal Inspectors in 2016, in which he admitted that “[w]hen I was working 
for [Aircraft Service International Group] JFK from 2012–2014 . . . [,] I acted as a 
lookout so that [four other individuals] could steal mail for currency.  They would tip me 
for looking out [and] they would lookout and I stole mail for the currency.”  A.R. 352–
53.  The PSR consistently indicates that the relevant time period is 2012 to 2014, and 
those dates were highlighted by the Immigration Judge and the Board.  Because the PSR 
is clear that Beresford’s conduct was ongoing throughout this time period, the 
Government has met its burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that Beresford 
began engaging in mail theft prior to July 22, 2013, and therefore within five years of his 
admission to the United States. 
* * * 
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is denied. 
